謂鄭王曰：「昭釐侯，一世之明君也；申不害，一世之賢士也。韓與魏敵侔之國也，申不害與昭釐侯執珪而見梁君，非好卑而惡尊也，非慮過而議失也。申不害之計事，曰：『我執珪於魏，魏君必得志於韓，必外靡於天下矣，是魏弊矣。諸侯惡魏必事韓，是我免於一人之下，而信於萬人之上也。夫弱魏之兵，而重韓之權，莫如朝魏。』昭釐侯聽而行之，明君也；申不害慮事而言之，忠臣也。今之韓弱於始之韓，而今之秦強於始之秦。今秦有梁君之心矣，而王與諸臣不事為尊秦以定韓者，臣竊以為王之明為不如昭釐侯，而王之諸臣忠莫如申不害也。

 

Someone[1] spoke to the King in Zheng[2], saying, "Marquis Zhaoxi[3] was a once-in-a-generation leader, and Shen Buhai[4] was a once-in-a-generation talent. At the time, Han and Wei were equally-matched opponents, but Shen Buhai and Marquis Zhaoxi went with their official insignia[5] to beg an audience from the Lord of Liang[6]. It was not because they enjoyed humiliation and disdained honour, nor that they were mistaken in their reasoning or that their logic had missed its mark - Shen Buhai had planned the affair carefully, saying, 'If I go to Wei carrying with me my official insignia, the Lord of Wei will take it that he can do as he wills with Han. Abroad he will treat All-Under-Heaven with gratuitous contempt, and will thus be condemned. The sovereign lords will come to hate Wei, and will thus serve Han's interests. In this way, by bowing down[7] before one man we will gain authority over ten thousand[8]. If we aim to weaken Wei's forces and reinforce Han's power, there is no better way than by going to pay respects in the court of Wei.'  That Marquis Zhaoxi listened to this advice and followed it shows he was an enlightened lord. That Shen Buhai thought carefully about the affair and spoke on the matter shows he was a devoted servant. Han is weaker now than it once was, and Qin is stronger now than it once was, but Qin is of the same mind now as the Lord of Liang was then. Nevertheless, Your Majesty's various servants have not done you the service of securing Han's safety by going to pay their respects to Qin. I humbly suggest that Your Majesty lacks the enlightenment of Marquis Zhaoxi and your servants lack the devotion of Shen Buhai.

 

「昔者，穆公一勝於韓原而霸西州，晉文公一勝於城濮而定天下，此以一勝立尊令，成功名於天下。今秦數世強矣，大勝以千數，小勝以百數，大之不王，小之不霸，名尊無所立，制令無所行，然而春秋用兵者，非以求主尊成名於天下也。昔先王之攻，有為名者，有為實者。為名者攻其心，為實者攻其形。昔者，吳與越戰，越人大敗，保於會稽之上。吳人入越而戶撫之。越王使大夫種行成於吳，請男為臣，女為妾，身執禽而隨諸御。吳人果聽其辭，與成而不盟，此攻其心者也。其後越與吳戰，吳人大敗，亦請男為臣，女為妾，反以越事吳之禮事越。越人不聽也，遂殘吳國而禽夫差，此攻其形者也。今將攻其心乎，宜使如吳；攻其形乎，宜使如越。夫攻形不如越，而攻心不如吳，而君臣、上下、少長、貴賤，畢呼霸王，臣竊以為猶之井中而謂曰：『我將為爾求火也。』

 

"In the past, Duke Mu of Qin[9] won one victory at Hanyuan[10] and gained hegemony over the western provinces. Duke Wen of Jin[11] won one victory at Chengpu[12] and brought order to All-Under-Heaven[13]. With a single victory each established their preeminence and earned a reputation throughout All-Under-Heaven. Qin has been growing stronger for generations now; accumulating dozens of great victories[14], and hundreds of minor ones[15], but its major victories have not seen it recognised as overlord, nor have its smaller victories seen it recognised as a hegemon. It has not established a respected name for itself and its instructions are not followed. If, despite this, its troops remain on operations year in, year out, this cannot be because it seeks the honour and respect of All-Under-Heaven[16]. Of the historical conquests of the former kings, some were made for fame and others for gain. Those who strove for fame conquered hearts, those who strove for gain conquered territories. In the past, in the war between Wu and Yue, the partisans of Yue suffered a great defeat, taking refuge upon Mount Kuaiji[17], and Wu's partisans entered Yue and pacified its inhabitants. The King of Yue[18] sent Counsellor Zhong[19] to negotiate a peace agreement with Wu, begging Wu to take Yue's men as servants and its women as handmaids. He walked behind the Wu officials bearing offerings of birds in his own hands[20]. As a result of this, the people of Wu listened to what he had to say, and made peace without demanding a formal treaty. Thus he conquered their hearts. The next time the two went to war, it was Wu's partisans who lost. Accordingly, Wu begged[21] Yue to take its men as servants and its women as handmaidens, offering Yue the same courtesies that Yue had previously offered Wu. Yue's partisans did not listen, and proceeded to crush the state of Wu, taking Fuchai[22] captive. Thus they conquered his territory. Now one who would conquer others' hearts you should follow the example of Wu, while one who would conquer their territories you should follow the example of Yue. However, if anyone expects lords and servants, those above and those below, the small and the great, the rich and the poor, to recognise him as a hegemon or overlord without having both Yue's ability to conquer territory and Wu's ability to conquer hearts, then your servant humbly suggests that he is like the man in the well who shouted up 'Let me get you a light!'[23] 

 

「東孟之會，聶政、陽堅刺相兼君。許異蹴哀侯而殪之，立以為鄭君。韓氏之眾無不聽令者，則許異為之先也。是故哀侯為君，而許異終身相焉。而韓氏之尊許異也，猶其尊哀侯也。今日鄭君不可得而為也，雖終身相之焉，然而吾弗為云者，豈不為過謀哉！昔齊桓公九合諸侯，未嘗不以周襄王之命。然則雖尊襄王，桓公亦定霸矣。九合之尊桓公也，猶其尊襄王也。今日天子不可得而為也，雖為桓公吾弗為云者，豈不為過謀而不知尊哉！韓氏之士數十萬，皆戴哀侯以為君，而許異獨取相焉者，無他；諸侯之君，無不任事於周室也，而桓公獨取霸者，亦無他也。今強國將有帝王之亹，而以國先者，此桓公、許異之類也。豈可不謂善謀哉？夫先與強國之利，強國能王，則我必為之霸；強國不能王，則可以辟其兵，使之無伐我。然則強國事成，則我立帝而霸；強國之事不成，猶之厚德我也。今與強國，強國之事成則有福，不成則無患，然則先與強國者，聖人之計也。」

 

"During the meeting at Dongmeng[24], Nie Zheng[25] and Yang Jian[26] stabbed the Chancellor[27] and the Lord of Han[28]. Xu Yi[29] kicked[30] Marquis Ai[31] to make him play dead, and then proceeded to establish him as the Lord of Zheng[32]. If there was no one in Han vast clan who refused to obey Marquis Ai's commands, it was because Xu Yi first set the example. Thus Marquis Ai became the Lord of Han, and Xu Yi served as his Chancellor until the end of his days. Because the members of the House of Han respected Xu Yi, they were willing to accord the same respect to Marquis Ai. Nowadays they say that[33] Your Lordship could not find such a person and put him to work, even if you offered to make him Chancellor[34] for life. If this is so, it is because we ourselves[35] have failed take on the role. How could this be down to anything but our own strategic inadequacy? In the past, Duke Huan of Qi[36] brought the sovereign lords together nine times[37], but never once failed to respect the orders of King Xiang of Zhou[38]. Thus it was King Xiang who had the respect and Duke Huan the power. If the sovereign lords respected Duke Huan enough to come nine times when he summoned them to meet, it was because of the respect he himself showed for King Xiang. Nowadays they say that the Son of Heaven could not find such a person and put him to work, even if he gave them the powers of Duke Huan. If this is so[39], it is because we ourselves failed to take on the role. How could this be down to anything but our strategic inadequacy or our failure to understand the rules of respect? The officials of the House of Han numbered in the hundreds of thousands, and if all of them supported Marquis Ai as their lord it was for no other reason than because he took Xu Yi as his Chancellor[40]. If, among the lords of the vasssal states, there were none who would not willingly serve in the halls of Zhou, it was for no other reason than because it was Duke Huan who held hegemonic power. Now a certain strong state[41] is about to take up the imperial burden, and the first to use his own state to advance this will be as its Duke Huan or its Xu Yi. Who could deny the quality of such a strategy? If we are the first to back this state and it can achieve imperium, then we can certainly benefit by making ourselves hegemons under its command, and if it cannot, then we will still benefit by avoiding[42] its military attentions, ensuring that it will not attack us. This being so, if it succeeds in its enterprise then we will have established an Emperor and made ourselves hegemons. If it does not, then it will still owe us an immense debt of honour. If we join it now and its[43] affairs succeed then we will benefit, while if they fail then we will suffer no adverse effects. This being so, being the first to back it would be the strategy of a sage."

​

[1] If the previous chapter is indeed a Su Qin speech, the implication would be that this chapter is a record of one by Zhang Yi. My suspicion is that it may originally have been by Han Fei, having been repurposed by Liu Xiang and his team to stand in for a lost Zhang Yi speech as was done in the Qin stratagems. 

[2] It is not clear which King is indicated here. Crump suggests King Xi (295-273 BCE). If this is indeed an unattributed Han Fei speech, this would imply King An (238–230 BCE).

[3] Marquis Zhaoxi (362–333 BCE) was mainly known for having employed Shen Buhai to reform Han's legal system.

[4] Shen Buhai was a legalist author and politician in Han, serving as Chancellor and reforming its political system.

[5] This refers to the jade tablets used to signify an official's authorisation to carry out specific missions. 

[6] Probably King Hui of Wei (369-319 BCE), who succeeded Marquis Wu following a violent succession conflict during which Wei was almost conquered by Han and Zhao. He conducted several discussions with Mencius and exchanged territory with Han, making his state easier to defend.

[7] Reading 俛 for 免, per the commentaries. 

[8] Following the interpretation given by the commentaries. 

[9] Reading 秦穆公 for 穆公, per the commentaries. Duke Mu of Qin (659–621 BCE) was celebrated for his use of talented advisors to expand Qin's territory. 

[10] Hanyuan is now called Hancheng, and is in Shaanxi.

[11] Duke Wen of Jin (636–628 BCE) was forced to flee his state while young following internal conflicts, and endured a long exile before returning to great success.

[12] The Battle of Chengpu took place in 632 BCE, near modern Chenliu in Henan.

[13] The commentaries disagree regarding the precise reading of this sentence, but the general sense is clear. 

[14] Reading 十 for 千, per the commentaries. 

[15] Reading 小 for 次, as in other versions. 

[16] The commentaries disagree regarding the precise reading of this sentence, but the general sense is clear. 

[17] Mount Kuaiji is now called Mount Xianglu. It is in modern Zhejiang.

[18] King Goujian of Yue (496–465 BCE) was defeated by Wu at the beginning of his reign and taken captive, but eventually returned to Yue, strengthened his state, and annexed Wu.

[19] Wen Zhong was a politician in Yue.

[20] A gesture of submission also mentioned in the Rites of Zhou.

[21] Bao suggests 謂 for 請 here.

[22] King Fuchai of Wu (495–473 BCE) was the last King of Wu. He held King Goujian of Yue captive for a time, but eventually released him, whereupon Goujian built up his state and finally conquered Wu. 

[23] This seems to refer to a story that has been lost. At a guess, it would have been something along the lines of: "A man crossing his courtyard at night falls into the well. He calls out until a passer-by hears and comes over to help, but the passer by cannot see to pull him out. The man in the well shouts back, 'Let me fetch you a light.'" It fits the theme of the speech and is the kind of internal contradiction that the people of the time enjoyed - comparable with the "shield that can block any blow/spear that can cut through any obstacle" joke mentioned in the Han Feizi.

[24] It is not clear where Dongmeng was, though it is mentioned in the chapter devoted to Nie Zheng as well. Yao suggests that this should be a separate chapter.

[25] Nie Zheng assassinated Chancellor Xia Lei on behalf of Yan Sui.

[26] Yang Jian assisted with the assassination plot.

[27] Xia Lei was a politician in Han. He served as Chancellor for a time before being assassinated by Nie Zheng on the orders of Yan Sui.

[28] Marquis Lie of Han (399 – 387 BCE) did not die in this attempt.

[29] Xu Yi was a politician in Han and also served as Chancellor. Crump suggests that this may be intended to refer to a son of Marquis Ai by the name of Yizi (壹恣)

[30] Following the commentaries, which also suggest 蹙 as an alternative reading for 蹴.

[31] Marquis Ai (376 - 374 BCE) was Marquis Lie's grandson. He did not succeed directly - his father, Marquis Wen, ruled between 387 and 376. The commentaries suggest that this may be an error for Marquis Lie. There are assassination stories about both, and the details are frequently confused.

[32] I.e. of Han. 

[33] The commentaries suggest 曰 for 日 here and below. 

[34] This passage is somewhat confusing, and modern translations disagree regarding the interpretation. The implication seems to be that the conflict within the Han family is such that no one member is able to form a dominant faction and ally himself with the King to compel the allegiance of those who may otherwise be tempted to go into business for themselves.

[35] Duke Huan of Qi (685–643 BCE) was the greatest ruler of Qi during the Spring and Autumn Period, and with his Chancellor Guan Zhong led the state to a position of hegemony over the other states. The ability to convoke them to meetings described here was a symbol of hegemony.

[36] This implication is that he could have used these gatherings to launch a rebellion against the Zhou court but did not do so.

[37] King Xiang of Zhou (651–619 BCE) was chased out of Zhou by his brother and only restored to the throne by Duke Wen of Jin.

[38] Reading ，然而吾 for 吾, per the commentaries.

[39] Reading 他也 for 他, per the commentaries. This interpretation follows modern Chinese readings.

[40] Qin.

[41] The commentaries disagree regarding the precise reading of this sentence, but the general sense is clear. 

[42] The commentaries suggest that the second 強國 here may be superfluous.